CTA work on “rideshare” regulation 136/26

Backgrounder: What changed between the April 21 and May 14^th drafts of Regulation 136/26

The final version of regulation 136/26  is meaningfully more detailed and precise than the original proposal across the operational mechanics of rideshare delivery. Several of these improvements reflect positions the Canadian Taxi Association advocated directly, either through the consultation process, the 2026 Ontario Budget Submission, or the Revised Pilot Framework submissions.

1. On driver standards, the demerit threshold tightened from 9 to 8 points, and the vague “convictions or suspensions to be defined” placeholder was replaced with a legally precise disqualifying convictions list covering terrorism, sexual offences, offences against persons, and controlled substances. The CTA had pressed for clearly defined and enforceable driver eligibility criteria — the final regulation delivered this, though it stopped short of the vulnerable sector check the CTA also recommended.
2. On training, the proposal’s vague “training as approved by MTO” was replaced with a codified curriculum that explicitly names anti-human trafficking as a mandatory training component. This is a direct and significant win. The CTA had consistently argued that training obligations must be substantive and listed, not discretionary — and must specifically address trafficking vulnerability in the northern corridor context. The final regulation reflects that position.
3. On accessibility, the 500-vehicle threshold — which the CTA identified as a designed exemption that would never be triggered by any operator entering a northern or rural market — was removed entirely. All operators, regardless of fleet size, must now maintain ongoing accessibility measures and procedures. This is a material improvement and directly responsive to the CTA’s submission. However, the specific fleet percentage obligation the CTA recommended was not codified — performance targets remain at the Registrar’s discretion.
4. On data security, the final regulation added an entirely new section (s.29) requiring encrypted transmission to the Registrar, breach notification, and separation of regulated records from proprietary platform data. The CTA had advocated for a data governance framework that places operational data under public oversight rather than platform custody — s.29 is a meaningful step in that direction, though it does not establish Ontario data residency requirements or municipal data access rights.
5. On station premises, a new provision (s.24) governs who may provide transportation at Northlander stations — something entirely absent from the original proposal. This reflects the CTA’s push to ensure that regulated rideshare operates within a defined and enforceable perimeter at the point of first- and last-mile connection.
6. On compliance and enforcement, formal compliance orders (s.12), a 30-day appeals process (s.11), and structured suspension and revocation powers replaced the proposal’s vague general language. The CTA had called for audit-ready, enforceable consequences as a precondition of pilot operation — the regulation now provides these tools, even if their practical deployment depends on Registrar capacity and cross-ministry coordination that has not yet been confirmed.
7. On driver identifiers, the regulation requires operator-issued identifiers visible from outside the vehicle and a driver identifier producible on police demand (s.16). The CTA’s 2026 Ontario Budget Submission specifically proposed the Ontario Commercial Driver Identity and Management System (OCDIMS) as a province-owned verification backbone with government-issued affixed decals carrying QR codes linking to a provincial registry. The regulation moved in this direction by formalizing the two-tier identifier system and giving the Registrar power to specify standards — but the OCDIMS architecture, the QR verification link, and government-issued standardized signage were not adopted. This remains outstanding CTA work.

What did not change, and is still needed

Despite the improvements above, the final regulation is structurally silent across the legal ecosystem in which it operates. Almost none of the CTA’s recommendations regarding platform dependency, competitive neutrality, or public governance architecture were adopted.

1. The  vehicle driver registration and real-time verification architecture through an Ontaro Commercial Driver Informaton Management System, which was the centrepiece of the CTA’s 2026 Ontario Budget Submission and supported by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, was not established. There is no provincial verification database, no police-integrated real-time system, no public consumer hotline, and no QR-code verification mechanism. A passenger at a Northlander station platform and an OPP officer at a roadside stop still cannot verify in real time that the driver, vehicle, insurance, and operator are currently authorized.
2. On signage and visual identification, while the regulation requires operator-issued identifiers visible from outside the vehicle and a driver identifier producible on police demand (s.16), suggestion on the formation of a Working Group of government, industry, law enforcement and technology experts to develop new systems using leading edge technology was not adopted. The CTA’s 2026 Ontario Budget Submission specifically proposed the Ontario Commercial Driver Identity and Management System (OCDIMS) as a province-owned verification backbone with government-issued affixed decals carrying QR codes linking to a provincial registry. The regulation moved in this direction by formalizing the two-tier identifier system and giving the Registrar power to specify standards — but the OCDIMS architecture, the QR verification link, and government-issued standardized signage were not adopted. This remains outstanding CTA work.
3. The insurance coverage gap in the pre-acceptance phase remains unaddressed, exposing passengers and third parties to liability voids that regulators in other jurisdictions have explicitly closed. The Insurance Act (RSO 1990, c I.8), FSRA oversight, and the three-phase insurance framework the CTA recommended are all absent.
4. The Employment Standards Act, the Digital Platform Workers’ Rights Act, 2022, and Heller (2020 SCC 16) are not referenced, leaving an active $400 million class action and Ontario’s own platform worker legislation entirely uncoordinated with the pilot. The CTA’s recommendation that all PTCs confirm ESA compliance and earnings transparency before any driver begins work was not adopted. A single tranferrable license for all commercial ground transportation drivers was not adopted.
5. The Competition Act is absent. The structural market advantages conferred on dominant platform operators through the 60-day grace period, fixed compliance cost barriers to smaller entrants, and the bifurcated taxi/PTC framework were never assessed for abuse of dominance or competitive neutrality. The CTA’s call for a published line-by-line comparison of pilot obligations against existing municipal bylaw requirements — and a Competition Bureau consultation — went unheeded.
6. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — sections 6, 7, and 15 — applies to this regulation as provincial law but receives no acknowledgment. No s.15 analysis of differential impacts on racialized passengers, passengers with disabilities, or those without digital access was published.
7. The duty to consult First Nations communities whose traditional territories overlap with or adjoin the 79 designated areas was not publicly documented. Named First Nations territories were removed from Schedule 1 without explanation.
8. Environmental law — the Environmental Protection Act, CEPA, the Fuel Tax Act — is entirely absent, despite 79 designated communities along a 740-kilometre corridor generating substantial vehicle emissions from induced demand and deadheading.
9. The algorithmic systems that actually govern pricing, dispatch, driver management, and deactivation — the operational core of every designated rideshare service — are entirely unregulated as to their internal logic. The CTA had called for algorithmic transparency, prohibition on automated deactivation without human review, and prohibition on surge pricing in captive were adopted.

Overall assessment

The new regulation achieves incremental progress in driver identifiers, accessibility and data retention — areas where the CTA’s specific, detailed recommendations were most directly engaged in the consultation process. That progress is real and should be acknowledged.

However, almost all of the CTA’s structural recommendations — particularly those addressing equivalent standards across operator classes, public governance architecture before market entry, labour law alignment, platform dependency reduction, and independent complaint infrastructure — were not adopted. The regulation authorizes market entry. It does not govern the market it authorizes.

The province’s, passengers’, and drivers’ dependence on platform control over prices, remuneration, dispatch, deactivation, and data remains essentially unchanged. The regulation has made the platform’s operating environment more defined — it has not made it more publicly accountable.

All 40 comparison items confirm a consistent pattern — the final regulation (O. Reg. 136/26) is more legally detailed and precise than the original proposal across operational requirements, but leaves critical governance functions in privacy law, labour law, competition law, public safety reporting, constitutional rights, Indigenous consultation, environmental accountability, and algorithmic regulation entirely outside the regulatory framework.

Expansion of this pilot province-wide without addressing these 40 dimensions would replicate these gaps at provincial scale.

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